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Abstract We analyse the impact of a labour market reform at the margin (an easier use of 
temporary contracts launched in Spain in 1984) across generations. As this type of reforms applies 
to new entrants into the labour market (or, in general, new hired workers), we use a regression 
discontinuity design to estimate a long-lasting effect on the mean temporary employment rates 
for generations entering into the labour market compared to those already in the labour market. 
The results show a relatively small impact related to the reform at the margin. By educational 
levels, the estimated effect of the reform at the margin on the mean temporary employment 
rate is close to zero for those with university level education for both genders.
© 2012 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Contratos temporales de generación en generación: los efectos a largo plazo  
de una reforma del mercado laboral en el margen
Resumen Analizamos el efecto de una reforma del mercado laboral en el margen (un uso más 
sencillo de los contratos temporales iniciado en España en 1984) de generación en generación. 
Como este tipo de reformas atañe a los que se incorporan por primera vez al mercado laboral 
(o, en general, a los nuevos trabajadores), utilizamos un diseño de discontinuidad de regresión 
para calcular el efecto a largo plazo en las tasas medias de temporalidad laboral para las 
generaciones que se incorporaron al mercado laboral tras la reforma respecto a los que ya se 
 encontraban en él. Los resultados muestran un efecto relativamente pequeño en relación con la 
reforma en el margen. Por niveles de formación, el efecto estimado de la reforma en el margen 
sobre la tasa media de temporalidad laboral es cercana a cero para las personas de ambos sexos 
con nivel universitario.
© 2012 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
reservados.
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1. Introduction
In the 1980s, all Western countries implemented different 
labour market reforms in order to increase labour market 
ÁH[LELOLW\DQGWKHUHE\HPSOR\PHQW%DUELHUL	6HVWLWR
%ODQFKDUG	/DQGLHU%RRWKHWDO'RODGR
HWDO+ROPOXQG	6WRUULH(YHU\ZKHUH
these reforms were implemented as gradual and/or partial 
changes of the institutional framework of the labour 
market. One type of this partial or gradual reform was the 
ÁH[LELOLW\DWWKHPDUJLQ, i.e., affecting only new entrants 
into the labour market and those moving to new jobs.
Temporary and fixed-term contracts are probably the 
PRVWLPSRUWDQWW\SHRIÁH[LELOLW\DWWKHPDUJLQ2ULJLQDOO\
they decrease hiring costs, but at the same time they 
are also characterised by much lower dismissal costs. 
Temporary contracts usually have low or even null severance 
payments, and very low administrative costs linked to the 
end of the contract, in contrast to an open-ended contract. 
Many European countries have promoted, under different 
UHJLPHVWKHXVHRIWHPSRUDU\DQGÀ[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWV
but Spain is the most prominent example. While, at the 
beginning in the 1980s, the proportion of wage and salary 
workers with a temporary contract (the temporary employ-
ment rate, TER) was around 10 per cent, and concentrated 
on construction and tourism industry (Fina et al., 1989), in 
the mid 1990s it rose to 33 per cent and affected all econo-
PLFDFWLYLWLHV7RKDULD	0DOR'RODGRHWDO
remaining around 30 per cent even after the implementation 
of different labour market reforms aimed at decreasing this 
rate in 1994, 1997 and 2006. In addition, the widespread use 
of temporary contracts were not mainly linked to temporary 
work agencies, as they were forbidden until 1994. In 
fact, the TER was above 30 per cent when these agencies 
began their activity, and nowadays they manage around 
SHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDOJURVVÁRZRIWHPSRUDU\FRQWUDFWV
(Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). On the above grounds, 
Spain is probably the most appropriate country to study any 
topic related to temporary contracts.
Previous research on temporary work has focused on the 
HIIHFWVRIÀ[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWVRQWUDLQLQJSURYLVLRQZRUN
LQMXULHVRURQVSHFLÀFJURXSVVXFKDV\RXQJSHRSOHZRPHQ
or low-skilled workers. Although some authors have analysed 
the relevance of different workers’ characteristics (such as 
age) of temporary workers (for example, Kahn, 2007), to 
our knowledge there is no previous research on the relevan-
ce of temporary contracts on long-term working trajectories 
using a generation approach. We will apply this approach to 
analyse the impact of the labour market reform fostering 
temporary contracts on working lives from a long-term 
perspective, using generations (defined as birth cohorts) 
as the main unit of analysis, and the aggregate temporary 
employment rate of different generations at different ages 
as the dependent variable. In these terms, this article adds 
WRWKHFXUUHQWLQWHUHVWLQWKHORQJWHUPHIIHFWVRIÁH[LELOLW\
in two-tier labour markets, originated by labour market 
reforms at the margin in different countries (Boeri, 2009). 
Therefore, we will determine whether there is a long-term 
impact on the temporary employment rate of different 
generations according to their different exposure to the 
labour market reform at the margin easing the use of tem-
po rary contracts by companies.
Probably, the most demanding challenge is how to evaluate 
the impact of a labour market reform at the margin. After the 
implementation of such reform all individuals are exposed 
WREHKLUHGXVLQJDWHPSRUDU\FRQWUDFW$WÀUVWVLJKWWKHUH
is not any ‘non-treated’ group as the exposure is complete 
for young generations entering into the labour market after 
the legal change, and the exposure is partial (not zero) for 
older generations already in the labour market when the 
reform was implemented. Therefore, the labour market 
reform at the margin poten tially affected the working lives 
of all individuals. Note, that our research will not compare 
working lives of indi viduals affected by the reform with a 
counterfactual of the working lives of individuals not affected 
by such reform. Such comparison is impossible, because we 
only observe the ‘real world’ with the implementation of this 
change in labour market regulation. What we can compare 
is the working lives of those entering into the labour market, 
after the implementation of this legal change, with the 
working lives of those already in the labour market before 
the reform. In this vein, we will focus on estimating the 
long-term impact (if any) of the labour market reform at 
the margin of 1984 on the mean TER of younger cohorts, 
along their observed working lives. Therefore, we are 
looking for a sort of ‘temporary contracts trap’ (or ‘long-
term preca riousness’) for younger generations consisting of a 
relatively higher TER throughout their lives. This is relevant 
because a higher TER can negatively affect critical life 
events, such as relevant delays in leaving the family home, 
declining fertility rates, lower probability of being eligible 
for a mortgage, poorer career prospects, higher risk of 
unemploy ment, etc. According to this rationale, we present 
a regres sion discontinuity design to isolate whether there is 
a long-run effect of the labour market reform at the margin 
implemented in 1984 on younger cohorts (i.e., on those 
cohorts entering into the labour market after such imple-
men tation), compared to older cohorts already in the labour 
market when the legal change was implemented. Our results 
will be disaggregated by educational level and gender.
We use micro-data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) from 1987 to 2010. To focus on generations, we 
will use the micro-data from the Spanish LFS to provide 
a novel picture of information by generation groups (i.e. 
birth cohort groups) throughout their life cycles. For this 
SXUSRVHZHXVHDUWLÀFLDOV\QWKHWLFFRKRUWV·PHWKRGRORJ\
widely used in Demography and Epidemio logy. We use this 
data aggregation in descriptive and econometric analyses.
We will show that, at a descriptive level, it is obvious that 
younger cohorts have a higher temporary employment rate 
at the beginning of their working careers, but according 
to their characteristics (educational level and gender) 
some of them have relatively faster declines in such rates. 
On the other hand, some workers experience a higher job 
mobility irrespective of their generation (such as workers 
with a low educational level). Older cohorts have a higher 
percentage of workers with low education levels, and when 
these workers lose their jobs they are also more relatively 
‘expo sed’ to a positive long-term effect on their mean tem-
porary employment rate throughout their working career (as 
they have a higher probability of being re-hired under the 
new legal regulation). In fact, the TER of older generations 
with a low education level increased very rapidly just after 
the implementation of the legal reform. The regression 
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discontinuity analysis shows that the long-run increases in 
the TER are rather low, especially for those with a university 
education level, and even more so if they are females. 
Therefore, although the observed differential in mean TER 
throughout the life cycle is the largest for younger cohorts 
of people with a university degree for cohorts closer to 
the discontinuity, such differences are not only linked to 
the reform at the margin but to differences between these 
cohorts.
2. Background
7KHH[WHQVLYHXVHRIÀ[HGWHUPDQGWHPSRUDU\FRQWUDFWVLQ
Spain stems from the 1984 labour market reform intended 
to foster employment and providing more flexibility to 
ILUPV'RODGRHWDO7RKDULD	0DOR7KH
legal reform in 1984 established a new type of temporary 
FRQWUDFWWKDWDOORZHGÀUPVWRKLUHHPSOR\HHVSHUIRUPLQJ
regular activities. Previously, temporary contracts existed, 
but they were mainly used for seasonal activities, such as in 
DJULFXOWXUHRUWRXULVPÀUPVRUIRUHFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHVZLWK
DYHU\VSHFLÀFWDVNDVLQWKHEXLOGLQJVHFWRUZKHUHPDQ\
FRQWUDFWVDUHOLPLWHGWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHVSHFLÀHG
building, road, etc. (Fina et al., 1989). 
The 1984 reform was implemented amidst the interna-
tional debate on labour market flexibility and, in the 
Spanish case, it was a response by the recently elected 
Socialist government to the pressures applied by employers, 
who would in fact have preferred a more sweeping reform 
'RODGR	0DORGH0ROLQD7RKDULD	0DOR
Although the trade union UGT (which was very close to 
the Socialist Party) originally supported this legal reform, 
later, this union, jointly with the other main union (CCOO) 
heavily criticized this reform for increasing job instability 
and spreading temporary contracts to all industries. This 
legal reform led to a fast (and unexpected at that time1) 
increase in the TER, reaching 30 per cent by the beginning 
of the 1990s, and affecting women more, who reached rates 
slight ly below 40 per cent in 1992 (see Figure 1).
In legal terms, the change was ‘small’ as there was only the 
introduction of a new type of contract available for employers 
and, therefore, not affecting current em ployees, but only job 
seekers expecting to be hired. How ever, the legal change was 
relevant because it allowed a much easier use of this type 
of temporary contract as it was possible to hire workers for 
SHUPDQHQWWDVNVLQWKHÀUPRQDWHPSRUDU\EDVLV7KLVZDVD
remarkable novelty as regards the traditional foundations of 
the Spanish Labour Law. 
As this was a legal change implemented by a new govern-
ment (with a political ideology markedly different from 
the previous government), and changing key concepts of 
Spanish Labour Law (in other words, ‘innovating’ in a way 
GLIÀFXOWWRSUHGLFWDWWKDWWLPHWKLVOHJDOUHIRUPFDQEH
considered as exogenous in terms that workers and emplo-
yers could not anticipate this legal change in order to delay 
or to anticipate a relevant amount of key decisions affecting 
the working lives of different generations in the long term. 
Here, manipulation by workers means that, for example, 
individuals enrolled in university anticipating the legal 
reform would quit their studies in order to be hired before 
the reform in order to decrease the risk of being hired with a 
temporary contract instead of an open-ended contract. This 
is not plausible because the expected returns of pursuing in 
university studies were higher than the alternative of being 
1. Later, many authors (for example, Dolado et al., 2002) linked 
WKLVH[WHQVLYHXVHRIWHPSRUDU\FRQWUDFWVE\ÀUPVZLWKWKHZLGH
JDSLQÀULQJFRVWVFRPSDUHGWRRSHQHQGHGFRQWUDFWV$OWKRXJKWKH
next labour market reforms tried to partially close this gap, de 
facto the firing costs gap has remained almost unchanged (Gar-
FtD0DUWtQH]	0DOR
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Figure 1 Temporary employment rate by gender in Spain. Source: LFS.
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hired for a non-university job before the reform. In addition, 
the high TER reached later, and its negative side effects were 
not anticipated by any researcher, labour practitioner, policy 
PDNHUHWF2QWKHVLGHRIÀUPVLWLVSRVVLEOHWRDUJXHWKDW
some employers postponed hiring decisions in order to use a 
temporary contract for vacancies related to permanent tasks 
instead of using open-ended contracts before the reform. 
However, such manipulating behaviour must have been very 
limited to immediately before the legal change, and without 
any relevant impact on working lives of different generations 
of workers. As mentioned before, this legal change did not 
follow long years of social and political debate. In fact, it 
ZDVDFKDQJHWDNHQE\DQHZJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHÀUVWSDUW
RILWVÀUVWIRXU\HDUOHJLVODWXUHDQGDIIHFWHG/DERXU/DZ
in a way not easy to anticipate, as the reform broke a key 
principle of the Spanish Labour Law tradition. On the above 
grounds, we will consider this reform at the margin as a 
discontinuity in terms of a regression discontinuity design.
The spread of temporary contracts was so huge that 
negative effects became visible in the 1990s. Many authors 
have stressed that such a huge proportion of temporary and 
À[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWVRQWRWDOZDJHDQGVDODU\ZRUNHUVKDV
different unintended and worrying effects: (a) on economic 
performance as less probability of participating in training 
(Albert et al., 2005), a lower growth in productivity (Bento-
OLOD	'RODGRRUKLJKHULQMXU\UDWHV*XDGDOXSH
2003); (b) on the postponement of starting a family, and 
IHUWLOLW\$GVHUD$KQ	0LUD0F*UDWK	.HLVWHU
2008); and (c) on working lives being longer and a more 
precarious period of labour market integration (OECD, 1998). 
In the two following decades, different legal changes in 
1994, 1997 and 2006 have tried to decrease the aggregate 
TER of the Spanish economy. In 1994, the legal regulation of 
À[HGWHUPVFRQWUDFWVZDVUHVWULFWHGDQGLQVRPHNLQGV
of temporary contracts were abolished.2 Moreover, a new 
permanent contract with lower severance pay for dismissed 
workers was created, although it was not appli cable to all 
the new employees,3DQGÀQDQFLDOVXEVLGLHVIRUHPSOR\HUV
XVLQJSHUPDQHQWFRQWUDFWVZHUHODXQFKHG7RKDULD	0DOR
7KHVHÀQDQFLDOVXEVLGLHVZHUHFKDQJHGLQVHH
7RKDULDHWDORU7RKDULD	&HEULiQ
However, in general, all these reforms have had partial 
but small effects on the aggregate TER4 and it has remained 
around 30 per cent.5 Only very recently, since 2007, we 
can see a slow decreasing change, providing descriptive 
evidence that the legal reform implemented in 2006 slightly 
decreased average TER (specially in the private sector and in 
VPDOOÀUPV0DOR	*RQ]iOH]6iQFKH]1HYHUWKHOHVV
the relevant decrease observed in 2008 is not related to 
any policy, but with the severe employment adjustment 
2. See, for example, García-Martínez and Malo (2007) and Malo 
and Toharia (2008) for further details on 1994 and 1997 legal regula-
tion reforms; on the 2006 reform see Toharia and Cebrián (2007).
3. The exception was males aged 30-45 years old with unemploy-
ment spells below one year, but in 2001 it was extended to other 
workers.
4. For instance, Kugler et al. (2002) observe that the reform in 
1997 seems to have had a positive net effect on permanent employ-
ment for young men and women, but not for older men.
5. Slightly below 30 per cent when considering exclusively the pri-
vate sector (Dolado et al., 2002).
due to the current economic recession (heavily focused on 
temporary contracts and in the construction sector at the 
beginning, and soon extended to the rest of the economy).
As regards the effects of temporary contracts on labour 
trajectories, previous research focuses on the analysis of tran-
sitions from temporary to permanent employment (Alba, 
$PXHGR'RUDQWHV*HOO	3HWURQJROR
Hernánz, 2003; Toharia et al., 1998). The main finding of 
WKHVHDQDO\VHVLVWKDWÀ[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWVFRQWULEXWHWRD
high level of transitions between jobs, even for temporary to 
permanent jobs. On the other hand, descriptive evidence 
from administrative longitudinal records does not seem to 
VKRZD¶ORQJWHUPWUDS·LQJHQHUDODOWKRXJKVHYHUDOVSHFLÀF
and small groups might remain in temporary employment for 
DORQJWLPH7RKDULD	&HEULiQ
Anyway, temporary contracts are mainly concentrated on 
new entrants, dominated by young people (everywhere, and 
not only in Spain; see, for example, Khan, 2007). Older 
people (those already in the labour market before the labour 
market reform was implemented) will have temporary 
contracts when they are re-hired after a dismissal or when 
they have a delayed entry (or re-entry) into the labour 
market. This situation for older workers is usually more 
common for those with lower education levels and for women 
with an intermittent working career due to family reasons.
The unequal generational allocation of temporary 
FRQWUDFWVDQGWKHLUFRVWVDQGEHQHÀWVKDVEHHQLQWHUSUHWHG
as an implicit intergenerational agreement (Garrido, 1996). 
While temporary contracts (and short-term unem ploy ment) 
are concentrated among young people who remain in their 
parents’ home, open-ended contracts and job security is 
concentrated among male breadwinners. Thus, since the 
1980s, parents (mainly husbands) were working under 
permanent contracts with a relatively higher employment 
VHFXULW\7KH\SDLGWD[HVWRÀQDQFHXQHPSOR\PHQWEHQHÀWV
DQGWKH\SURYLGHGGLUHFWÀQDQFLDOVXSSRUWWRWKHLUVRQVDQG
daughters who were enrolled in the education system or with 
temporary contracts in the labour market. The result was a 
drastic change in the orga ni sation of Spanish families, with a 
very important postpone ment of family formation for young 
people, and a decrease in the fertility rate below 1.3, which 
LVXVXDOO\NQRZQDVDORZHVWORZIHUWLOLW\UDWH%LOODUL	
.RKOHU*DUULGR	0DOR
This unequal distribution of job instability and unemploy-
ment by generations linked to adaptations and changes in 
family organisation would be behind the ‘social peace’ of 
Spanish society, although the unemployment rate has been 
relatively high since the 1980s compared to other OECD 
FRXQWULHV*DUULGR7RKDULD	0DOR+RZHYHUD
relevant cost of this ‘social peace’ has been a high aggregate 
TER linked with many structural problems in the Spanish 
economy (Toharia et al., 2005).
3. Database and main variables: generation, 
age and education level
We used data from the Spanish LFS6 for the period 
1987-2010, launched by the Spanish Statistical Office 
6. In Spanish (QFXHVWDGH3REODFLyQ$FWLYD or EPA in short.
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(Instituto Nacional de Estadística) following EUROSTAT 
standards that are based on International Labour Orga-
nisation recommendations on labour market statistics. 
The Spanish LFS covers the population residing in private 
households.7 The sample size in each quarter is appro-
ximately 65,000 households (around 200,000 indivi duals). 
The LFS has information regarding the personal and labour 
characteristics of individuals (sex, age, employment status, 
employment characteristics of the main job, labour status, 
previous work experience, search for employment, etc.). In 
the second quarter of 1987 a question was added in order to 
capture the type of contract of the individual. Therefore, 
RXUHPSLULFDODQDO\VLVEHJLQVZLWKDQGLWÀQLVKZLWK
2010, and all observations correspond to the period follow-
ing the implementation in 1984 of a labour market reform at 
the margin allowing a much easier use of temporary 
contracts. Therefore, these data do not allow any before-
after analysis of this labour market reform, but we can 
observe what happens for different groups (here, genera-
tions) throughout their working lives after the reform. 
6SHFLÀFDOO\ZHFDQFRPSDUHORQJWHUPUHVXOWVLQWHUPVRI
their temporary employment rate) of generations entering 
into the labour market after the implementation of the 
1984 reform with generations already in the labour market 
when such reform was implemented.
$VZHZDQWWRIRFXVRQJHQHUDWLRQVZHGHÀQHDUWLÀFLDO
(synthetic) cohorts and we follow them for the whole period 
covered by our database (1987 to 2010). For artificial or 
synthetic cohort analysis, it is not necessary to follow the 
same individuals over time. It is enough to simply observe a 
representative sample of individuals with the same charac-
teristics over time (as the LFS does). For example, in the 
survey of year 1 we have a representative picture of in-
dividuals aged 20-25. In the survey of year 2 we have a 
representative picture of individuals aged 21-26. As the 
sample of the survey is partially renewed, the interviewees 
are not exactly the same group in both years. However, 
they are equivalent from a statistical perspective, because in 
each year the sample is designed to give a proper 
representation of population. If we define groups of 
LQGLYLGXDOVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHLUELUWKFRKRUWLQWKHÀUVWDYDLODEOH
year, we can follow this group until the last available year (in 
our case, over 23 years, from 1987 to 2010).8
Individuals are assigned to cohorts based on year of birth, 
from 1921 to 1995, each cohort consisting of 5 birth years. 
Later, in the econometric analysis, we will restrict ourselves 
to 12 generations, beginning with the 1926-30 birth years and 
ending with 1981-1985. We apply this restriction becau se we 
7. Foreign nationals are included in the resident population 
if they have lived or intend to live in Spain for more than one 
year.
8. There is an implicit assumption in this reasoning: there is not 
any external shock adding new individuals to the birth cohorts. 
However, in Spain, the proportion of foreign immigrants has grown 
VLJQLÀFDQWO\VLQFHFKDQJLQJWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRISRSXODWLRQOLY-
ing and working in Spain. In order to maintain the homogeneity of 
our birth cohorts throughout the whole time period, we restrict the 
analysis to Spanish individuals who were born in Spain. We exclude 
those not born in Spain because a non-negligible proportion of im-
migrants from Latin America are eligible for double nationality, 
which they usually apply for when they have the right to do so.
observe the oldest generations only at the end of their labour 
trajectory while for the youngest ones we only observe their 
ÀUVWVWHSVLQWRWKHODERXUPDUNHW:HDJJUHJDWHGDWDLQWR
cells considering age (in 5 years intervals), education level 
(3 levels), birth cohort, and year. We use this aggregation for 
men and women separately. As we are not interested in 
seasonal changes of TER, we only take the second quarter of 
each year (as it is the trimester less af fec ted by seasonality9). 
$VUHJDUGVDJHYDULDEOHWKLVFRQVLVWVRIÀYH\HDUJURXSVIURP
25-30 to 56-60. Note, that below 25 we would have many 
individuals enrolled in the education system (especially for 
those with university level) and after 60 years early 
retirements become relati vely frequent. Focusing on ages 
from 25 to 60, we observe individuals with a higher 
attachment to the labour market. With education level, we 
consider three levels: up to the mandatory level, secondary 
level (post-mandatory secon dary education and vocational 
training), and university level. We use only three levels in 
order to have enough obser vations in the corres ponding cells, 
particularly for the lowest level. Finally, we have, for each 
gender, a dataset of 1,020 cells when restric ting to 12 birth 
cohorts.10 Each cell is weighted using the weights provided by 
the LFS which are coherent for different years when using 
DUWLÀFLDOFRKRUWV*DUULGR	&KXOLi:HLJKWVDUHXVHG
in des criptive and econo metric analyses.
In Figures 2 and 3 we show the TER of the different gene-
rations for each age group11 (for males and females, 
respectively). Cohorts younger than those born in 1961-1965 
(and, therefore, entering into the labour market once the 
1984 reform was implemented) have the highest peaks in 
the TER. These cohorts have a TER above 70 per cent until 
they are 22-26 years old. The rate decreases considerably 
until they are 30-34 years old. In this age group the TER 
becomes rather stable at a level of around 30 per cent 
(slight ly higher for women than for men). 
The incidence of temporary contracts by gender shows 
that women have a slower decreasing pattern in TER. In 
addition, female older cohorts born before 1956 suffered a 
clear increase in TER immediately after the reform (notice 
WKDWWKHÀUVWREVHUYDWLRQ\HDUIRUWKHVHFRKRUWVLV
These differences are consistent with the higher TER obser-
ved with the cross-sectional data in Figure 1.
The level of education plays a major role in the labour 
market. It is well-known that a higher level of education 
leads to a greater probability of employment and the 
opportunity to secure better jobs. In this sense, in cross-
sectional data, those with a university degree show a lower 
TER than the rest of the population (Dolado et al., 2002; 
Toharia et al., 2005). Figure 4 shows the TER for the two 
extremes of education up to the mandatory level and 
 ,QIDFWÀJXUHVIRUWKHVHFRQGTXDUWHUDUHWKHFORVHVWWRWKH
mean of the corresponding year.
10. We have 1,020 cells instead of 4,140 (=24 years × 12 co-
horts × 5 years intervals × 3 educational levels) because we can not 
follow all cohorts in all covered years. In fact older cohorts are 
PDLQO\REVHUYHGLQWKHÀUVWSDUWRIWKHSHULRGZKLOH\RXQJHUFR-
horts are mainly observed in the second part. This is also the reason 
for leaving aside the oldest and the youngest cohorts, and to res-
trict the dataset to 12 cohorts.
 ,Q)LJXUHDQGVXFFHVVLYHÀYH\HDUDJHJURXSVRYHUODSLQ
order to have smoother shapes.
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Figure 2 7HPSRUDU\HPSOR\PHQWUDWHE\JHQHUDWLRQDVÀYH\HDUVELUWKFRKRUWJURXSVDQGE\DJHJURXSIRUPDOHV6RXUFH/)6
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university (both by gender). For men and women the TER is 
much higher and remains higher for longer periods for 
individuals up to mandatory education level in all cohorts. 
The difference is especially intense for older cohorts: while 
those with university level have a TER below 10 per cent 
when they are over 35 years old, those up to mandatory 
education level deal with rates over 20 per cent even at the 
end of their working careers. For cohorts born after 
1956-60 we see that, in the case of those with a university 
level, there is a relatively rapid decrease in their TER, from 
80 per cent when they are 16-20 years old to below 30 per 
cent when they are 30 years old. Those up to mandatory 
education level experience the same high TER at the 
beginning of their employment trajectories but we do not 
observe the same decrease over time; on the contrary, 
these cohorts exhibit a relatively higher TER during their 
ZKROHOLIHF\FOH6RÀ[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWVDUHWKHPDLQZD\
of entering the labour market for young cohorts, indepen-
dently of their level of education; the difference is that 
those with university studies improve their employment 
situation (in terms of job stability) rapidly while those with 
the lowest levels of education do not. By gender the general 
pattern by education level is quite similar, although with a 
higher TER in each education level and a slower decrease as 
age increases, especially for those women up to the 
mandatory education level.
4. Econometric analysis
4.1. A regression discontinuity design
We will estimate the impact of the labour market reform 
at the margin on the average TER throughout the working 
life on different generations using a regression disconti-
nuity design (RDD). Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we 
use the framework of treatment effects literature to pre-
sent the main characteristics of the RDD.
Let us consider an individual i (or a unit as a birth cohort) 
and two potential outcomes for this individual: Yi(1) if the 
individual or the unit is treated and Yi(0) otherwise. Of 
course, the causal effect of the treatment will be the 
difference Yiî<i(0). However, the basic problem is that 
we cannot observe both results because an individual is only 
observed as treated or not treated. The empirical strategy 
consists of focusing on average effects of the treatment 
over two populations, treated and non-treated groups. The 
difference Yiî<i(0) between both populations only cap-
tures the causal effect of the treatment if the charac-
teristics of treated and non-treated populations are the 
same. Therefore, individuals or units must be randomly 
assigned to the treatment and to the non-treatment (or 
control) group.
In an RDD the randomisation between treated and non-
treated observations (the so-called ‘unconfoundedness’ 
DVVXPSWLRQ5RVHQEDXP	5XELQLVWULYLDOO\VDWLVÀHG
if the discontinuity separating treated and non-treated 
groups is really exogenous and individuals can not 
manipulate their assignment into the treated and 
non-treated groups. In fact, as Lee (2008) formally shows, 
RDD does not assume randomisation, but it is a consequence 
of the inability of an agent to precisely manipulate the 
assignment variable near the discontinuity cut off. Following 
Lee and Lemieux (2010), when the variable used to assign 
the treatment is above a well defined threshold, the 
treatment dummy is always equal to 1. When the assignment 
variable is below the thres hold, the treatment dummy is 
always equal to 0. Therefore, conditional on the assignment 
variable, there is no other variation in the dummy treatment 
variable and, as the cut off defining the threshold is 
exogenously determined, it is not correlated with any other 
factor. 
Formally, considering that c is the cut off in the assignment 
variable Z, we only observe E[Yi(1)|Z], for example, to the 
right of the cut off (the treatment group) and E[Yi(0)|Z] to 
WKHOHIWRIWKHFXWRII'HÀQLQJDVŢWKHEDQGZLWKDURXQGWKH
cut off, the average causal effect of the treatment at 
the cut off c is the following:
In other words, we can estimate the average causal 
HIIHFWRIWKHWUHDWPHQWGHÀQHGE\WKHGLVFRQWLQXLW\c if Z 
(and any other factor) is continuous and therefore the 
group of those right below the cut off (the non-treatment 
group) is a valid counterfactual for those right above the 
cut off (the treat ment group). A consequence of this 
reasoning is that rando misation in RDD is only strictly 
JXDUDQWHHGLQWKHYLFLQLWLHVRIWKHFXWRII,PEHQV	
/HPLHX[/HH	/HPLHX[7KHUHIRUHDFUXFLDO
issue is the size of the bandwith around the cut off. 
However, a closer approach to the threshold has costs, 
because it will decrease the number of cases included in 
the estimations and, therefore, the precision of estimated 
FRHIÀFLHQWVPLJKWEHPXFKORZHUVWDQGDUGHUURUVZLOOEH
larger). On the other hand, including cases far from the cut 
off will improve precision (standard errors will be smaller), 
but at the risk of losing ‘unconfoun ded ness’. When 
including more individuals far from the threshold, the 
likelihood of having variables other than the cut off 
affecting the outcome variable will be higher. The length of 
the bandwith in the assignment variable is a common 
problem in RDD. The classical solution consists of estimating 
models with different bandwiths and including some 
covariates as controls in the estimations. Some authors 
 ,PEHQV 	 .DO\DQDUDPDQ  SURSRVH VWU LFWO\
quantitative methods to estimate the optimal bandwith.
How do we confront these usual concerns of RDD in this 
research ? First, as we explained at the beginning of the 
second section, the labour market reform at the margin 
implemented in 1984 was fully exogenous. Therefore, the key 
LVVXHLVKRZWRGHÀQHWKHFXWRIILQPHDQLQJIXOWHUPVRIRXU
research, that is, whether there are systematic differences in 
TER along the life cycle for generations entering into the 
labour market after the 1984 reform as regards to those 
generations already in the labour market before the reform.
7KHFXWRIILVGHÀQHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHDVVLJQPHQWYDULDEOH
to the ‘treatment’. Therefore, the assignment variable is 
the age in 1984. As we are interested in results aggregated 
by birth cohort, our assignment variable is the mean age for 
each cell (by age group, cohort, education level and year). 
7KHVLPSOHVWGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHFXWRIILVWKHPLQLPXPOHJDO
age for working, which is 16. Therefore, individuals of less 
than 16 years in 1984 were fully exposed to the effects of 
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WKHUHIRUPDZLGHUXVHRIWHPSRUDU\FRQWUDFWVE\ÀUPV
during their whole working lives. On the other hand, indi-
viduals over 16 years were potentially in the labour market 
when the reform was implemented, and therefore they 
would be only affected if they lost their jobs or they have a 
delayed entry into the labour market. 
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that those following 
secondary level education and university education will have 
a delayed entry into the labour market as regards the 
minimum legal age to participate into the labour market in 
1984. Therefore, we will estimate separate models for these 
individuals, changing the cut off and considering the most 
common age for finishing the corresponding education 
levels: 18 years for secondary education and 23 years for 
university education.12 Individuals usually enter into the 
ODERXUPDUNHWDIWHUÀQLVKLQJWKHLUVWXGLHVEXWIRUFKHFNLQJ
robustness of results we will also include estimations with 
the 16 years old cut off for the secondary and university 
levels and 18 years old also for the university level. As usual, 
12. Therefore, we are considering 5 years as the normal period for 
ÀQLVKLQJXQLYHUVLW\VWXGLHV,QXQLYHUVLW\VWXGLHVXVXDOO\ODVW-
ed 5 years, with two main exceptions. On the one hand, some de-
grees lasted 3 years (the so-called Diplomaturas). On the other 
hand, physicians, architects and some engineers lasted 6 years. 
While the cut-offs of 16 and 18 are clear, there is more room for 
KHWHURJHQHLW\GHÀQLQJ\HDUVROGLQDVWKHFXWRIIIRUHQGLQJ
university studies and being exposed to the effects of the labour 
market reform at the margin.
WKHFXWRIIVDUHGHÀQHGDVGXPP\YDULDEOHVZKHUHPHDQV
entering into the labour market after the implementation of 
the labour market reform (being less than 16, 18 or 23 years) 
and 0 the opposite.
Figures 5 and 6 show the TER considering the assignment 
variable for the full sample and by education levels for 
both genders, with different cut offs (16, 18 and 23 in 
1984). In all of them, the picture is rather different on both 
sides of the cut off. Maybe, the most remarkable difference 
is the higher dispersion for younger individuals, especially 
for those with university level. However, for those up to the 
mandatory education levels, observations with only a bit 
more than 16 years in 1984 have a dispersion rather similar 
to those entering in the labour market after 1984. In 
addition, in all cases for much older generations, the con-
cen tration is in rather lower TER. For both genders, the 
picture is similar, although dispersion is larger for women, 
irrespective of the education level. Therefore, the visual 
examination of the out come variable provides a first 
approach to the eventual effects of the discontinuity (the 
labour market reform at the margin of 1984) on the outcome 
variable (TER).
As regards the bandwith in the assignment variable (mean 
DJHZHKDYHFKRVHQDGHÀQLWLRQLQWHUPVRIELUWKFRKRUWV
as this is more meaningful for our analysis than simply con-
sidering an interval of some years above and below the 
corres ponding cut off. This will allow link the results more 
directly with the differences between generations. Anyway, 
we will check different possibilities including more or less 
Figure 5 Temporary employment rates by education level with the corresponding cut offs (males only).
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birth cohorts in estimations, beginning with estimations 
including all generations.
7KHHFRQRPHWULFVSHFLÀFDWLRQZLOOEHWKHIROORZLQJ
where a denotes age group, c corresponds to birth cohort, j is 
education level, and, finally, t is time (year). All these 
variables and the aggregation procedure were described in 
Section 3.
We estimate this regression using OLS, and we report 
results with robust standard errors, clustered when possible 
by birth cohort (defined as 5 year intervals as described 
in previous sections). In addition, we estimate different 
models by gender and three education levels (up to the 
man datory level, secondary education and university level). 
The left hand side variable, Y, is the TER.
Our primary interest focuses on Š1 as the coefficient of 
AGE1984ZKLFKLVKDYLQJDVSHFLÀFDJHIRUZRUNLQJLQ
(the year the reform at the margin was implemented). As we 
explained before, we will use these different ages in 1984 
(16, 18 and 23) for different education levels. As the above 
expression shows (see second and third terms), the assign-
PHQWYDULDEOHGHÀQHGDVPHDQDJHLQHDFKFHOOFHQWUHGDW
the corresponding cut off) can have a different form above 
and below the cut off age.
We have considered a reduced set of covariates13 (X): a set 
of dummies of the education levels considered, a linear time 
trend, and step dummies for 1994, 1997 and 2006. The 
expected effect of education is a decrease in the TER when 
education level increases. The rationale is, that with a 
higher education level, workers are potentially more pro-
GXFWLYHDQGPRUHYDOXDEOHIRUÀUPVDQGWKHUHIRUHPRUH
13. Covariates are usually included in RDD. However, note that as 
‘unconfoundedness’ is granted around the threshold of the assign-
ment variable covariates should be redundant, as treated and 
non-treated individuals would be randomly selected considering 
DQ\REVHUYDEOHDQGQRQREVHUYDEOHYDULDEOH,PEHQV	/HPLHX[
/HH	/HPLHX[+RZHYHUFRYDULDWHVDUHLQFOXGHGWR
control some remaining heterogeneity for some particularly rele-
vant variables, such as educational level, time trend and before-af-
ter regulation changes in our case. Anyway, covariates should not 
KDYHDGLVFRQWLQXLW\DURXQGWKHWKUHVKROG/HH	/HPLHX[
For the education level, we have checked this continuity assump-
tion with our data using graphs. They are available upon request.
Figure 6 Temporary employment rates by education level with the corresponding cut offs (females only).
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suitable to sign an open-ended contract. We introduce step 
dummies in the three years as previously mentioned to 
control for effects related with the legal regulation changes 
of these years, as some of them tried to affect the relative 
use of temporary contracts (as we explained in the second 
section). However, these dummies are only controls and they 
are not a proper evaluation for the effects of such reforms.
A common issue in RDD is that the results can be sensitive 
to the specification of the model. This is the reason why 
some authors propose the use of non-parametric models 
when using an RDD (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We have esti-
mated some non-parametric models and we will com ment 
on these results later.14
14. The non-parametric results are not included in the text, but 
they are available upon request.
Finally, as behaviour and outcomes of men and women in 
the labour market are markedly different, models have 
been estimated separately by gender.
4.2. Results and discussion
:HKDYHWZRVHWVRIUHVXOWV7KHÀUVWRQH7DEOHVKRZV
the estimations including all generations and clustering by 
12 birth cohorts. The second one (Table 2) includes the 
results considering only the closest cohorts to the corres-
ponding cut off, but without clustering (because of the 
small number of clusters).
Now, we comment on Table 1. The upper panel corres-
ponds to males. Considering the 16 years cut off, the 
impact of the reform of 1984 ranges from an increase of 
3.9 percen tage points (pp) in TER for the full sample and 
for those with lower education level to an increase of 
3.9 pp in TER for those with lower education level. The 
effect is stronger for secondary and university level for the 
Table 1 Regression Discontinuity results on the TERajct (weighted data and clustered errors by 12 birth cohorts)
 ALL EDUC1 EDUC2 EDUC2 EDUC3 EDUC3 EDUC3
Males
Cut off: 16 years in 1984 0.039** 0.039** 0.038*** 0.058***
Cut off: 18 years in 1984 0.041*** 0.056**
Cut off: 23 years in 1984 0.033***
$JHî&XWRII î î î î î î î
Age* (Cut off) 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018***
Educ1: Up to mandatory  
 educ. level
0.142***
Educ2: Secondary level î
Linear time trend î î î î î î î
Reform 1994 (1=Yes) 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045
Reform 1997 (1=Yes) î î î î î î î
Reform 2006 (1=Yes) î î î î î î î
Constant 0.290*** 0.423*** 0.309*** 0.284*** 0.305*** 0.275*** 0.201***
R2 0.7804 0.8119 0.7256 0.7302 0.729 0.7372 0.7505
N 607665 351019 152004 152004 104642 104642 104642
Females
Cut off: 16 years in 1984 0.0365 0.0344 0.0014 0.0586**
Cut off: 18 years in 1984 0.0208 0.0696***
Cut off: 23 years in 1984 0.0515***
$JHî&XWRII î î î î î î î
Age*(Cut off) 0.0106*** 0.0009 0.0080*** 0.0075*** 0.0184*** 0.0181*** 0.0199***
Educ1: Up to mandatory  
 educ. level
0.1185***
Educ2: Secondary level î
Linear time trend î î î î î î î
Reform 1994 (1=Yes) 0.0493** 0.0577*** 0.0520* 0.0512* 0.0290 0.0286 0.0299
Reform 1997 (1=Yes) î î î î 0.0070 0.0059 0.0074
Reform 2006 (1=Yes) î î î î î î î
Constant 0.3685*** 0.4514*** 0.3832*** 0.3542*** 0.4229*** 0.3804*** 0.2776***
R2 0.7134 0.7785 0.7319 0.7333 0.8149 0.8231 0.8330
N 368249 156096 100433 100433 111720 111720 111720
a, age group; c, birth-cohort (generation); EDUC3, University education level; j, education level; t, time (year). 
 6LJQLÀHVVWDWLVWLFDOO\GLIIHUHQWIURP]HURDWWKHOHYHORUEHWWHUDWWKHOHYHORUEHWWHUDQGDWWKHOHYHORUEHWWHU 
Reform variables are step dummies (1=year of the reform onwards).
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18 years cut off: a TER increase of 4.1 pp and 5.6 pp, 
respectively. Finally, the threshold of 23 years shows a 
smaller impact of 3.3 pp on the TER of males with university 
level. Therefore, in gene ral the reform increased the job 
instability of cohorts ente ring into the labour market after 
the reform. To have a reference point to evaluate the 
PHDQLQJRIWKHVHFRHIÀFLHQWVLWZRXOGEHXVHIXOWRKDYH
another look at Figure 1. This Figure shows that the 
observed TER for all the men was around 30 percent for 
the most part of the decades of 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, 
although the estimated effects are not negligible (and for 
the 18 years cut off of university males it reaches 5.6 pp) 
they do not seem particularly large. A remarkable feature 
of these results is that the lowest education level does not 
show a clearly higher effect and it is even lower than the 
PRVWRIWKHHVWLPDWHGFRHIÀFLHQWVIRUWKHVHFRQGDU\DQG
university level. Similarly, in the first column, the 
estimation for all individuals, the lowest educa tion level 
has a fixed effect of 14.2 pp as regards the other two 
education levels. Both types of results are not contra-
dictory. While having up to the mandatory education level 
increases TER to 14.2 pp compared to the other two educa-
tion levels, younger cohorts up to the mandatory level have 
a TER 3.9 pp higher than older cohorts up to the mandatory 
education level. In a complementary way, although the 
university level is related to a lower TER (and higher job 
stability) compared to being below the secondary level, 
younger cohorts with university level have a higher TER 
than older cohorts with a university degree. In other words, 
they have greater job instability than their older counter-
parts.
For females (second panel of Table 1), the impact of the 
UHIRUPLVRQO\VWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLÀFDQWIRUWKRVHZLWK
university level. For this group of women the reform increa-
sed their TER from 5.1 pp to 6.7 pp (23 years and 18 years 
cut off, respectively). Also for women, the reform increased 
job instability for younger cohorts compared to older cohorts 
of women with a university level, although they have more 
job stability than women below the secondary level (as the 
HVWLPDWHLQWKHÀUVWFROXPQVKRZV+RZHYHUIRUWKHUHVWRI
Table 2 Regression discontinuity results on the TERajct (weighted data and robust standard errors; 2 birth cohorts)
 ALL EDUC1 EDUC2 EDUC2 EDUC3 EDUC3 EDUC3*
Males
Cut off: 16 years in 1984 0.0231 0.0238 0.0337 0.0051
Cut off: 18 years in 1984 0.0362 0.0322
Cut off: 23 years in 1984 0.0066
$JHî&XWRII î î î î î î î
Age*(Cut off) î î î 0.0060 0.0136 0.0170 0.0191
Educ1: Up to mandatory educ. level 0.1522
Educ2: Secondary level î
Linear time trend î î î î î î î
Reform 1994 (1=Yes) 0.0511 0.0708 0.0252 0.0301 0.0197 0.0211 î
Reform 1997 (1=Yes) î î î î î î î
Reform 2006 (1=Yes) 0.0070 î 0.0313 0.0325 0.0422 0.0424 0.0379
Constant 0.4785 0.5952 0.4757 0.4343 0.6083 0.5428 0.2661
R2 0.8745 0.8504 0.8639 0.8591 0.8193 0.8199 0.7413
N 164714 82448 53875 53875 28391 28391 33304
Females
Cut off: 16 years in 1984 î î î 0.0140
Cut off: 18 years in 1984 0.0288 0.0496
Cut off: 23 years in 1984 0.0091
$JHî&XWRII î î î î î î î
Age*(Cut off) 0.0040 î 0.0065 î 0.0043 0.0125 0.0208
Educ1: Up to mandatory educ. level 0.1105
Educ2: Secondary level î
Linear time trend î î î î î î î
Reform 1994 (1=Yes) 0.0321 0.0503 0.0363 0.0365 î î î
Reform 1997 (1=Yes) î î î î î î 0.0124
Reform 2006 (1=Yes) 0.0057 î 0.0206 0.0195 0.0222 0.0229 0.0251
Constant 0.5242 0.5541 0.5022 0.4634 0.6631 0.5896 0.3320
R2 0.7930 0.8354 0.7999 0.7997 0.8559 0.8571 0.8088
N 118579 42697 39456 39456 36426 36426 38420
a, age group; c, birth-cohort (generation); EDUC3, University education level; j, education level; t, time (year).  
5REXVWVWDQGDUGHUURUV:HLJKWHGGDWD$OOFRHIÀFLHQWVDUHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLÀFDQW5HIRUPYDULDEOHVDUHVWHSGXPPLHV 
(1=year of the reform onwards). 
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ZRPHQWKHUHIRUPGRHVQRWFUHDWHDVLJQLÀFDQWGLIIHUHQFH
in TER between younger and older cohorts.
As we explained in a previous section, the effects of the 
discontinuity should be also checked considering data 
around the cut off. Table 2 shows the results considering 
only 2 cohorts, 1961-65 and 1966-70, with the exception of 
individuals with a university degree considering the cut off 
of 23 years. For this last case, the two cohorts are 1956-60 
and 1961-65, in order to have one cohort on both sides of 
the corresponding cut off. In these estimations, standard 
Figure 8 Mean temporary employment rate (TER) for the whole life cycle of all cohorts by education level (females only).
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Figure 7 Mean temporary employment rate (TER) for the whole life cycle of all cohorts by education level (males only). 
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errors are robust but they are not clustered by cohorts, as 
we are only considering two cohorts.15
The estimated effects shown in Table 2 are smaller than 
those reported in Table 1. Particularly for those with a 
university degree where the estimated effect is very close 
to zero (0.66 pp for men and 0.91 pp for women).16 For 
males, the effect is an increase of 2.38 pp for those up to 
the mandatory education level, and an increase from 3.37 
to 3.62 pp for the secondary level (cut off of 16 and 18, 
respectively). For women, the estimated effect is negative, 
EXWUDWKHUVPDOOîSSDQGSRVLWLYHIRUWKHFXWRIIRI
18 years for those with secondary level (2.88 pp).
Using Figures 7 (males) and 8 (females) we can compare 
the observed change in mean TER for different cohorts 
with the size of estimated effects related to the labour 
market reform at the margin. The black vertical line divides 
cohorts considered in estimations for the two lower 
education levels and the grey vertical line does the same for 
the university level. For the lowest education level and 
secondary education, the observed difference in the mean 
TER between 1961-65 and 1966-70 cohorts is around the 
double the change closely linked with the labour market 
reform (for both genders). However, the observed difference 
in the mean TER between 1956-60 and 1961-65 for indivi-
duals with university education is slightly below 10 pp (for 
both genders) but the estimated change in TER compa-
ring both cohorts attributed to the labour market reform at 
the margin is below 1 pp. 
'HÀQLWLYHO\WKHVHUHVXOWVDVDZKROHGRQRWVXSSRUWWKH
view that the labour market reform at the margin has crea-
ted a key difference between generations, leaving younger 
cohorts in a sort of ‘permanent trap’ of precarious ness. On 
the contrary, our results show that in the worst case the 
reform might explain an increase in the mean TER of 
younger generations of slightly below 4 pp for cohorts with 
secon dary level directly related to the implementation of 
the reform. Particu larly in the case of people with university 
level, the observed differences in mean TER between 
cohorts are main ly related to differences in the charac-
teristics of the cohorts, and not with the reform at the 
margin.
Finally, as a robustness check, we have estimated non-
parametric models17 (not reported here, but available 
upon request). In these estimations, the bandwiths are 
narrower18 than those considered in estimations shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. The effect of the labour market reform at 
the margin is either non-significant or slightly negative 
15. Due to cell weighting, together with the lack of clustering, all 
FRHIÀFLHQWVLQ7DEOHDUHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLÀFDQW7KHUHIRUHWKHSUH-
cision of estimations of Tables 1 and 2 are not strictly compa rable.
16. Considering the other cut offs, the largest effect is for the cut 
off of 18 years (3.22 pp for men and 4.96 for women).
17. For our estimations we have used the ‘rd’ command for Stata 
developed by Nichols (2011). The ‘rd’ command allows estimating 
local linear regression models on both sides of the cut off, using a 
triangle kernel. In addition, we have also used the syntax programs 
provided by G. Imbens on his personal web page: (http://www.eco-
nomics.harvard.edu/faculty/imbens/imbens.html), which is based 
on the notes by Fuji et al. (2009).
18. The default bandwidth of the command ‘rd’ is based on Fuji et 
al. (2009) to minimise MSE, or squared bias plus variance, in a sharp 
RD design.
(but always very close to zero) for the mandatory 
education level and the secondary level. For the university 
level, the estimated effect of the reform was positive and 
around 2 pp. There fore, although non-parametric models 
provide results a bit different from those obtained with 
the linear models of Tables 1 and 2, they do not change the 
main con clusion for those with university level, as 
the effect of the labour mar ket reform at the margin is 
very low com pared to the observed difference shown in 
Figures 7 and 8. However, these non-parametric results do 
not compare different cohorts (as we wanted) but cells 
LQVLGHDVSHFLÀFQDUURZHUEDQGZLWKDURXQGWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ
cut off, and therefore they do not have an interpretation in 
terms of birth cohorts as the rest of our results.
5. Conclusions
In this research we have analysed the incidence of 
temporary employment across generations and the 
long-term impact of a labour market reform easing the use 
RIWHPSRUDU\FRQWUDFWVE\ÀUPV2XUGDWDFRPHIURP6SDLQ
where this type of labour market reform was implemented 
in 1984 and where the temporary employment rate has 
been among the highest in Europe in the last two decades. 
We evaluate the impact of this reform at the margin on 
GLIIHUHQWJHQHUDWLRQVGHÀQHGDVELUWKFRKRUWV$VDUHIRUP
at the margin only affects those entering (or re-entering) 
the labour market, we focus on the comparison of those 
entering into the labour market after the implementation 
of the reform at the margin and those already in the labour 
market in 1984. Therefore, we are not providing a compa-
rison before-after the reform nor a counterfactual of what 
would have happened without such reform, but a 
comparison of workers at the margin and workers only at 
the margin if they lose their job or have a delayed entry 
into the labour market.
For this evaluation we use micro-data of the Spanish 
/DERXU)RUFH6XUYH\WRGHÀQHDUWLÀFLDORUV\QWKHWLFELUWK
cohorts from 1987 to 2010. We follow for this period 12 
ELUWKFRKRUWVGHÀQHGDV\HDUVJURXSV7KHUHDUHUHOHYDQW
obser ved differences by gender, as women usually have a 
higher TER throughout their working lives almost 
irrespective of their birth cohort. Descriptive differences by 
education level are remarkable. For those up to the 
mandatory educa tion level, the TER increased relatively 
rapidly after the implementation of the reform for older 
cohorts (those al ready in the labour market in 1984), and 
for those entering after the reform at the margin the TER 
was initially relatively high and slowly decreases as age 
increases. For those with a university degree, TER remained 
almost unchanged for older cohorts after the reform, and 
although for younger cohorts the TER is very high at the 
beginning of their working life, it decreases at a faster pace 
as age increases.
Econometric estimations of the effect of the labour 
market reform at the margin are based on a regression 
discontinuity design. The discontinuity is the reform, as it 
can be considered as exogenous as regards the behaviour of 
ZRUNHUVDQGÀUPV:HGHÀQHWKHFXWRIIDVWKHHQWHULQJDJH
into the labour market by education level (16 for those up 
to the mandatory education level, 18 for those with secon-
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dary level, and 23 for those with a university degree). The 
esti mated impact on the mean TER for cohorts entering into 
the labour market after the legal change of 1984 is relatively 
small, and does not support the view that the reform has 
heavily affected younger generations and creating a long-
term relevant increase in TER throughout their working 
lives. This is particularly not true for those with a university 
degree. Although, for those with university level, the obser-
ved difference between the cohort entering after the reform 
and the cohort already in the labour market is the largest 
one (around 10 percentage points), almost the whole 
difference is related to differences between both cohorts, 
and not with the discontinuity created by the labour market 
reform at the margin of 1984. In the vicinities of the cut off 
of 23 years in 1984, the effect directly related to the reform 
at the margin is 0.66 percen tage points for males and 
0.91 for females.
Of course, these results do not support whether this 
reform was ‘good’ or ‘positive’ for the welfare of individuals. 
That is a different question concerning a comparison of the 
observed results under the reform and a counterfactual 
scenario without such reform (or with a reform for all and 
not just at the margin). Our results are based on comparisons 
with data obtained after the implementation of the reform 
for all cohorts. Therefore, our regression discontinuity 
analysis stresses that observed differences in mean TER for 
different cohorts (especially for those with university level) 
are mainly associated with differences between cohorts 
entering after and before the implementation of the labour 
market reform at the margin of 1984, and not strictly with a 
heavy impact of the easier use of temporary contracts on 
younger cohorts.
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